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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

No. 444

ALBERT J. WILD,

Petitioner,

v.

BENNETT Y. BREWER, Revenue Agent of the Internal Revenue Service,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

W. LEE MCLANE
2101 Connecticut Ave., N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Counsel for Petitioner

JACK E. BROWN
THADDEUS ROJEK
ARTHUR P. ALLSWORTH
Of Counsel

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No.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner prays for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the above-entitled case entered on June 2, 1964.

OPINIONS BELOW

The first opinion of the Court of Appeals, upholding the Fifth Amendment Constitutional claim of petitioner, with Judge Koelsch dissenting, is reported at 329 F. 2d 924 and is reprinted in Appendix A hereto.

The second opinion of the Court of Appeals, entered in substitution of the Court's prior opinion and rejecting petitioner's claim "on the authority of *Grant* v. *U. S.*

(1912) 227 U. S. 74 and *Wilson* v. *U. S.* (1911) 221 U. S. 361," with Judge Madden dissenting, is as yet unreported and is reprinted in Appendix B hereto.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on June 2, 1964. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The questions presented are:

(1) Whether an individual under criminal investigation should be deprived of the protection of the United States Constitution Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, properly invoked in response to an attempt by the investigating authority to compel production of his business records, because he has conducted his business as the sole stockholder of a one-man corporation?

(2) If so, whether, in the circumstances here presented, the attempt to compel such disclosure by administrative subpoena under § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code is violative of the United States Constitution Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures?

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves both the Fifth and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, all of which provisions are set forth in Appendix C hereto.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves the Constitutional claims of petitioner, properly invoked under the provisions of the Fifth and Fourth Amendments, in response to the issuance by respondent, a Special Intelligence Agent investigating petitioner for alleged criminal conduct or error, of an administrative summons issued under § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code to testify and produce certain records and respondent's application to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona for a writ of body attachment to compel petitioner to testify notwithstanding his Constitutional claims. The records subpoenaed were designated records of Air Conditioning Supply Company and certain other business records ("Ledger of memorandum accounts kept by bookmaker (Yousem et al)") (R. 7-8 and 40-41) and the summons was addressed to "Albert J. Wild, President, Air Conditioning Supply Company."

At the hearing before the District Court, after issuance of the writ of attachment, it was established that petitioner was, and always had been, the sole stockholder of Air Conditioning Supply Co., a corporation which he organized and controlled in all respects and the books and records of which he maintained in his personal possession at his residence. (R. 53-54, 56.) Prior to the filing of any articles of incorporation, petitioner had conducted his business in similar fashion as a sole proprietor under the same name. (R. 36.) Respondent had been engaged in his criminal investigative work concerning petitioner since about January 15, 1963, his office being exclusively concerned with criminality. (R.48-49, 43.) The reason for issuance of the summons or the necessity thereof was not in any way stated at the hearing.

Upon the foregoing, the District Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law holding, with respect to petitioner's Constitutional claims, that "the privilege against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure cannot be claimed by a corporation," concluding that respondent was entitled to the books and records designated and directing petitioner to produce them. (R. 10-12.)

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, omitting any reference to respondent's reliance also upon the Fourth Amendment, first held, in an opinion by Judge Madden to which Judge Koelsch dissented, that the better reason supported petitioner's entitlement to claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment and directed that the order appealed from be set aside and the application of respondent dismissed. Thereafter, respondent petititioned for rehearing en banc and thereupon, with Judge Madden dissenting, rehearing was granted upon the written memoranda filed and, at the same time, the prior opinions of Judge Madden and the dissenting opinion of Judge Koelsch were withdrawn and in substitution therefor there was filed an opinion by Judges Merrill and Koelsch briefly affirming the judgment below "on the authority of *Grant* v. *U. S.* (1912) 227 U. S. 74 and *Wilson* v. *U. S.* (1911) 221 U. S. 261" and a thorough dissenting opinion by Judge Madden.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The essential reasons why the writ sought should be granted, briefly stated, are as follows:

First, taking into account the modern-day prevalence—facilitated and in effect encouraged by the development of business organization law—of the one-man corporation as

a preferred mode of small business organization, the true import of the case may be seen as deciding whether the Fifth Amendment is to retain, or be blighted of, significance in the setting of today's reach of the government against the indivdual in his ordinary affairs. A question of such moment surely deserves the attention of this Court. The necessity and timeliness of the granting of a writ in this case to determine that question is testified to by the fact that the present state of law, as found by the Court of Appeals, apparently is based on a 1913 decision of this Court which, as Judge Madden's decision perceptively points out, (i) was merely syllogistic in approach, based on an earlier quite different case without specific consideration of the distinctive position of the incorporated indiviual, and (ii) appears to be in conflict with the more recent decisions and reasoning of this Court in Fifth Amendment cases.

Second, this case presents a poignant issue as to the fair administration of criminal justice since the present decision, if allowed to stand, would require discrimination as to the availability of the safeguard of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination between different persons based merely on organizational form rather than substance.

Third, this case also raises the question of whether, despite the Fourth Amendment, self-incriminating disclosure may be compelled in a criminal investigation merely by the issuance of an administrative subpoena (without benefit even of any showing that such invasion of Constitutional right is warranted or required). That question alone deserves explicit consideration by this Court to provide a further direction that, despite the drive of Special Intelligence Agents to convict, Constitutional right should be fully preserved and respected.

Argument

I

IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE SUBSTANCE AND SPIRIT OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND TO THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE THAT THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE PRINCIPAL QUESTION PRESENTED AND REVERSE THE DECISION BELOW.

Since this Court considered the applicability of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the production of corporate records—in *Wilson* v. *United States*, 221 U. S. 361 (1911), *Wheeler* v. *United States*, 226 U. S. 478 (1913) and *Grant* v. *United States*, 227 U. S. 74 (1913)—the conditions affecting the organization and operation of individual enterprises in the United States have undergone radical change. In particular, with encouragement of new individual enterprises always in mind, our laws have facilitated the utilization by individuals of the corporate form of business organization and the one-man company in result has been popularly employed. Nevertheless, realistically—and there is every reason in a case such as this one involving an important Constitutional provision to so view the matter, avoiding fictitious theory "in an atmosphere of make-believe"—it still is well understood that the one-man corporation is truly a sport in corporate law and in almost all circumstances is merely the other name, the instrument, or, as the cases say, the *alter ego* of the individual. See, *e.g.*, Fuller, *The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company*, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (1938); Comment, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 632, 636-637 (1961). So much has the ambivalent position of the closely held corporation been acknowledged that, even with respect to income taxes, Congress has allowed the stockholders of a closely-held

corporation (with less than ten stockholders) to elect to be taxed as if there were no corporation. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1371-1377. In that setting it is respectfully submitted that there is not any reason of weight why the incorporated individual should be deprived of the protection of the Fifth Amendment merely because of his incorporation. As Judge Madden so tellingly stated in his dissenting opinion below, the situation of the multiply-owned corporation "has no application whatever to Wild's situation" and "the argument that one who incorporates has only himself to blame if he thereby forfeits his constitutional rights is not of Constitutional weight." See also Comment, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 632; *cf.* Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1595 (1960).

Indeed, the majority opinion below, rendered by most conscientious judges, did not purport to state a reasoned result but instead frankly declared that the decision was rested entirely "on the authority of" the *Grant* and *Wilson* cases, *supra*. (Although the *Grant* case in the main has been understood as merely a reaffirmation of the *Wilson* ruling that corporations as such were not entitled to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and the actual holding appeared justified on unrelated grounds, the decision does constitute an impediment to fresh consideration of the question presented.) Accordingly, unless the writ here sought is granted, however much reason may rebel against the result, frustration of a vital Constitutional right will necessarily continue.

Moreover, such a result, ironically, would appear to be inconsistent with at least the spirit of the more recent Fifth Amendment decisions of this Court, providing a further compelling reason for granting the writ in this case. Again as stated by Judge Madden:

> ". . . nothing which the Supreme Court has decided or said in the last two decades can be recon-

> ciled with the view that a dry syllogistic approach could compel an individual to produce his own papers from his own possession to assist his government to convict him of crime. The language of the Court in *Ullman, supra,* in 1956; that of the Court in *White, supra,* in 1944, seems to me to say that the Court will not decide a question of the constitutional right of an individual on the basis of a dry syllogism such as that General Motors is a corporation and its president could not refuse to produce its records on the ground that they might incriminate him; Air Conditioning Supply Company is a corporation, therefore its president, though he is the sole owner of the corporation and its records, cannot refuse to produce its records."

It will be recalled that the decisions referred to, well analyzed in Judge Madden's opinion, are *Ullmann* v. *United States,* 350 U.S. 422, in which the Court defined explicitly the spirit in which the Fifth Amendment provision against self-incrimination should be approached, directing that "This contitutional protection must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spirit," and *United States* v. *White,* 322 U. S. 694, in which the Court eschewed any mechanical organizational test in deciding whether or not a labor union was entitled to invoke a personal privilege (the subpoena in that case having been directed to the union alone) and instead declared that:

> "The test, rather, is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constitutents but rather to embody their common or group interests only." [322 U. S. at 701.]

See also the statement of the Court in *Malloy* v. *Hogan,* 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1493, recognizing that ". . . the American

system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay." For other cases following the lead of the *White* case in rejecting any mechanical, absolute test, *cf. Application of Howard*, 210 F. Supp. 301 (W. D. Pa.), excluding from an order directing the production of corporate records any item of "a personally owned company in which no other person other than the sole stockholder has any pecuniary interest"; *Application of Daniels*, 140 F. Supp. 322 (S. D. N. Y.), as interpreted in *United States* v. *Boccuto*, 175 F. Supp. 886, 889 (D. N. J.); and *Application of House*, 144 F. Supp. 95, 101 (N. D. Cal.). In short, if the spirit of constitutional interpretation radiated in such decisions is to be made animate and if the latitude allowed in the *White* case for invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to private papers or papers held in a purely personal capacity is ever to be given organic, effective meaning, it should be declared in this case that petitioner's Constitutional claim should be respected.

The foregoing reasons for granting the writ sought are further intensified by the unfair administration of criminal justice which otherwise will accrue. For example, the cases which have arisen in recent years, applying the test set out in the *White* case, have held that a partner of a small partnership with which the partners have maintained close identification and concerning which they have maintained control, as distinguished from "the large and impersonal partnership," may maintain the inviolability of partnership records upon a claim of privilege by one of the partners. *United States* v. *Linen Serv. Council*, 141 F. Supp. 511 (D. N. J.); *In re Subpoena Duces Tecum*, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N. D. Cal.). See also *United States* v. *Lawn*, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S. D. N. Y.); *United States* v.

Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190, 210 (S. D. N. Y.); and, for an earlier partnership case, *United States* v. *Brasley*, 268 Fed. 59 (W. D. Pa.) But see *United States* v. *Onassis*, 133 F. Supp. 327 (S. D. N. Y.). Thus, unless the decision below is reversed, the anomalous outcome will be that the Fifth Amendment privilege of the members of a partnership enterprise may be sustained but that, for the incorporated individual, the privilege would be destroyed. Surely with respect to a matter of constitutional law such a patent irrationality should be avoided and, where required, corrected.

II

IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE SUBSTANCE AND SPIRIT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND TO THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE THAT THE DECISION BELOW SHOULD BE REVERSED.

It is clear from the record in this case that, despite respondent's misnomer of his status as a Revenue Agent of the Internal Revenue Service instead of, in fact, a Special Intelligence Agent (R. 33, 43), the government in this case is proceeding through respondent to seek to convict petitioner of an alleged crime, not to ascertain tax liability as such or to collect taxes. See also Burns, *Searches and Seizures: The Suppression of Evidence*, N. Y. U. 20th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1081, 1087 (1962); *United States* v. *Lipshitz*, 132 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E. D. N. Y.). Accordingly, the utilization of § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code in the circumstances presented raises a fundamental Constitutional question as to the effect of the prohibition contained in the Fourth Amendment. As explained in *Application of Myers*, 202 F. Supp. 212 (E. D. Pa.), enjoining preliminarily the enforcement of a § 7602 summons

issued by a Special Agent (in circumstances where an indictment already had been obtained),

> "We believe the Government's purpose . . . is contrary to our fundamental and deep-seated conceptions of fair play. See United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. C. Mass. 1953) . . . It should not oppress a defendant who stands accused of a crime and whose liberty is at stake . . . by invoking in aid of a criminal charge the processes which Congress has authorized for the administration of the revenue laws. The court will not permit evasion of the traditional procedure in criminal trials embodied in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by resort to the great administrative powers in aid of the revenue laws which are granted by Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U. S. C. A. § 7602). [202 F. Supp. at 213.]

Similarly in the case cited in the *Myers* decision, *United States* v. *O'Connor*, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass.), Judge Wyzanski denied an application for the issuance of an administrative subpoena sought by a Special Agent although only one of the purposes of the Agent was to aid in a criminal prosecution. Recognizing the limited purpose of a Treasury subpoena, the Court further emphasized that in criminal matters Congress has never vested the executive with an unrestricted subpoena power and, in a resounding opinion, stated that:

> "The Constitution of the United States, the statutes, the traditions of our law, the deep rooted preferences of our people speak clearly. They recognize the primary and nearly exclusive role of the Grand Jury as the agency of compulsory disclosure
>
> . . . .
>
> "To encourage the use of administrative subpoenas as a device for compulsory disclosure of testimony to be used in presentments of criminal cases would diminish one of the fundamental guarantees

> of liberty. Moreover, it would sanction perversion of a statutory power. The power under § 3614 was granted for one purpose, and is now sought to be used in a direction entirely uncontemplated by the lawgivers. The limitations implicit in every grant of power are that it will be used not colorably, but conscientiously for the realization of those specific ends contemplated by the donors of the power." [118 F. Supp. at 250-251.]

But *cf. In Re Magnus, Mabee* v. *Reynard, Inc.*, 311 F. 2d 12, 16 (2nd Cir.); *Boren* v. *Tucker*, 239 F. 2d 767 (9th Cir.) (not recognizing the special status of a Special Intelligence Agent); *Application of Howard*, 210 F. Supp. 301, 303 (W. D. Pa.).

The vice of permitting utilization of an administrative subpoena in the circumstances here presented is magnified by the fact that at no time did respondent deign to provide any explanation whatever why the summons here issued was warranted or required, his issuance of the summons apparently having been accepted as sufficient without move notwithstanding the provision of the statute that enforcement of a § 7602 administrative subpoena requires a hearing before a Judge who may enforce the summons "if satisfactory proof is made." The better reasoned cases interpreting this provision of the Code have held that the government must carry the burden of demonstrating the need for the investigation (that is, for example, where fraud is suspected, that a reasonable basis exists for a suspicion of fraud). See *United States* v. *Powell*, 325 F. 2d 914 (3rd Cir.); *O'Connor* v. *O'Connell*, 253 F. 2d 365 (1st Cir.); *Lash* v. *Nighosian*, 273 F. 2d 185 (1st Cir.), *cert. denied*, 362 U. S. 904; *United States* v. *Cary*, 218 F. Supp. 298 (D. Del.). *Contra, Foster* v. *United States*, 265 F. 2d 183 (2nd Cir.). The force of that conclusion is buttressed by the additional statutory provision in § 7605(b) that "No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary ex-

amination or investigation . . ." Thus, in this case there appears what has been described as "the spectacle of administrative government run riot."

In such circumstances, the Court should not hesitate to grant relief—if for no other reason, to clear the air and have a restorative effect upon the administration of justice by Special Intelligence Agents in accordance with "traditional procedure" in criminal matters, having due regard for the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Although the Court of Appeals did not treat this second question in its opinion, plainly it is of Constitutional weight and deserving of special consideration by this Court. In that regard, although it would appear that the issue is sufficiently precise and developed so that an expression of opinion by the Court of Appeals is not required, at the very least the case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals with the direction to consider this second question so that the entire Constitutional import of the case will be assessable and appreciated.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

August 31, 1964.

Respectfully submitted,

W. LEE MCLANE
2101 Connecticut Ave., N. W.
Counsel for Petitioner
Washington, D. C.

JACK E. BROWN
THADDEUS ROJEK
ARTHUR P. ALLSWORTH
Of Counsel

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALBERT J. WILD, *Appellant*, vs. BENNETT Y. BREWER, Revenue Agent of the Internal Revenue Service, *Appellee*.	No. 18,860

[March 19, 1964]

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona

Before: MERRILL, Circuit Judge; MADDEN, Judge of the Court of Claims; and KOELSCH, Circuit Judge.

MADDEN, Judge:

Brewer, an agent of the Secretary of the Treasury, served upon Wild a summons addressed to

> Albert J. Wild, President
> Air Conditioning Supply Company

requiring Wild to appear before Brewer to give testimony relating to the tax liability and or the collection of the tax liability of "the above named person" and to bring with him and produce for examination certain books and records specified in the summons. All of the books and records specified were books and records of Air Conditioning Supply Company.

Appendix A.

Wild appeared, pursuant to the summons, but refused to produce the books and records called for in summons. He gave as the reason for his refusal the fact that the production of the books and records might tend to incriminate him and thus compel him, in a criminal case, to be a witness against himself in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that to compel him to produce the books and records would amount to an unreasonable search and seizure, in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. He stated that Air Conditioning Supply Company, though it was a corporation was owned 100 per cent by himself, and was completely controlled and directed by him.

Brewer's summons to Wild was, as it showed on its face, issued pursuant to Section 7602, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C., 1958 ed., § 7602. Section 7604 gives to the appropriate United States District Court the power, upon application by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, to issue an attachment against a person neglecting or refusing to obey a summons issued under § 7602, as for contempt. Brewer made an application to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. That court issued the attachment, held a hearing at which evidence was taken and arguments were heard, and thereafter made findings of fact and stated conclusions of law to the effect that the privilege against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure cannot be claimed by a corporation; that the records requested were the property of Air Conditioning Company, Inc.; and that Brewer was entitled to get the records. The court ordered Wild to appear before the court at a specified time and produce the records.

Wild brought the instant appeal from that order of the District Court. The records were placed in escrow in a bank, and a stay was granted pending this appeal. The issue, then, in the appeal is whether Wild, who might be incriminated by what was written in the documents which were called for in the summons, could, in the circumstances, refuse to turn the documents over to the Government.

The privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, against the Government of the United States, "in any criminal case" not to be compelled to be a witness against one's self, is available not only to defendants in criminal trials but to witnesses in any kind of official proceeding under the auspices of the United States. It applies not only to the giving of oral testimony, but to the production from one's possession of incriminating documents or objects. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, at least if the possession is coupled with a certain minimum of right. See United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 699.

Whether the Constitutional Fathers were wise or not in inserting this guaranty in the Constitution might now, 172 years after its insertion, be regarded as irrelevant, except that when, in a case such as the instant one, it is sought to extend the guaranty beyond the borders marked by the precedents, it may be permissible to weigh the arguments which, in this country and in England, have been advanced for and against the privilege.

In the 1911 case of Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, Mr. Justice McKenna, at page 392, in an eloquent dissenting opinion strongly urging a generous interpretation of the privilege, referred to certain critical discussions of the privilege in legal literature. He said:

> Indeed, eminent legal names may be cited in criticism, if not ridicule, of the policy expressed by the Fifth Amendment, that is, the policy of protection against self-incrimination. It is declared to have no logical relation to the abuses that are said to sustain it, and that the pretense for it, so far as based on hardship, is called an "old woman's reason," (also a "lawyer's reason,") and a "double distilled and treble refined sentimentality." So far as based on unfairness it is called "the fox hunter's reason," its basis being that a criminal and a fox must have a chance to escape, the subsequent pursuit being made thereby more interesting.

Justice McKenna cites Bentham on Judicial Evidence, 1827, vol. 5, page 229 et seq., for the foregoing. His own brief response is, "A reply would be difficult if government had no other concern than the punishment of crime."

In the 1937 case of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking *obiter*, for all but one of the Justices, said:

> What is true of jury trials and indictments is true also, as the cases show, of the immunity from compulsory self-incrimination. Twining v. New Jersey, 221 U. S. 78. This too might be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as in the past there are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity as a mischief rather than a benefit, and would limit its scope or destroy it altogether. No doubt there would remain the need to give protection against torture, physical or mental. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278. Justice, however, would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry.

Appendix A

In Ullman v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 426, 427, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, for the Court:

> It is relevant to define explictly the spirit in which the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination should be approached. This command of the Fifth Amendment ("nor shall any person * * * be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself * * *") registers an important advance in the development of our liberty—"one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized." Time has not shown that protection from the evils against which this safeguard was directed is needless or unwarranted. This constitutional protection must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spirit. Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege. Such a view does scant honor to patriots who sponsored the Bill of Rights as a condition to acceptance of the Constitution by the ratifying states. . . .

There is without question a general doctrine that an officer of a corporation who, as such officer, has custody of its records may not successfully refuse to produce those records in response to a subpoena issued to the corporation and served upon him as custodian, on the ground that the records contain material which would incriminate him. Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361. In that case Mr. Justice Hughes, during his earlier period of service on the Court, wrote the opinion which directly so held. The result of the decision was that Wilson, the president of the corporation, being already under indictment by the same grand jury which subpoenaed the corporation's records,

was held to have been validly sentenced for contempt for refusal to supply to the grand jury documents which would be used to convict him of the crimes which the grand jury was investigating. His sentence for contempt was that he be committed "until he delivers to the United Wireless Telegraph Company the said books called for by said subpoena, and ceases to obstruct and impede the process of this court, or otherwise purges himself of this contempt." The other directors of United Wireless were willing to produce the records if they could get them from Wilson. Wilson's plight was an unhappy one. Was it because he did not *own* the books which he was refusing to produce? Appellant Wild in our case quotes from United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 699, the statement:

> * * * the papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege, *or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity.* (Italics added)

Wilson, of course, did not own the books nor did he have custody of them in a purely personal capacity.

A corporation does not have the Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. It therefore cannot, if its records are subpoenaed, assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 382. It may, however, complain that a search is unreasonable if the demand for production is so broad as to be unjustifiably burdensome. Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151, 156-158. But if a corporation, though under a duty to produce its records pursuant to a subpoena, is unable to do so because, as in Wilson v. United States, supra, the corporate officer who has custody of the records will not surrender them for production, one practical way to obtain them is

by pressure on the officer. That was done in *Wilson* by his imprisonment for contempt.

With some background in the applicable doctrine, we return to the situation of the appellant Wild and his circumstantial relation to the Constitutional privilege. His corporation as such was not, as we have seen, entitled to the privilege. He did not claim the privilege for the corporation, and could not have done so. He claims it for himself, and says that he, and not any artifical legal entity, will be the one to suffer the punishment if he is obliged to furnish to the Government the evidence which will bring about his conviction. *Wilson* made the same contention, but his contention was rejected.

Wild quoted from White v. United States, 322 U. S. 694, 701:

> The test, rather, is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents but rather to embody their common or group interests only.

Wild says that since he is the sole owner of his corporation, the corporation does embody the "purely private or person interests of its [only]constituent(s)," who is Wild himself.

If there are several or many or perhaps even two stockholders in a corporation, it may well be urged by those who no part in any wrongdoing by the corporation or by its president or secretary who had custody of the books that their corporation and they have a right not to be embarrassed or damaged by their officer's suppressing

the records which belong to them, and which he holds only as custodian for them. That was the situation in *Wilson*, supra. That reason has no application whatever to Wild's situation. He being the sole owner of the corporation, no one but himself can be affected by what he does with it, or to it. Before the summons was served, he could have destroyed the records, or, indeed, everything that the corporation owned, without accountability to anyone.

What we have just said seems to leave the Government with no reason for denying the Fifth Amendment privilege to Wild, except the reason that the records which he suppressed belonged to a corporation and that, therefore, *Wilson* and other precedents deny him the Constitutional privilege. But his case differs from *Wilson's* in a respect which the Supreme Court thought, in *United v. White*, supra, deserved the careful, though *obiter*, expression hereinabove quoted.

With regard to any importance which may attach to the fact that the records belonged to a corporation and were, merely for that reason, particularly subject to be made available to the United states, we confess, with deference, that the reason given in Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 382, viz. the impliedly reserved visitatorial power of the state which created the artificial legal entity, which power somehow is transferred to the Federal Government, seems to us to be something of a make-weight in the cases in which it has been expressed. And we think that the argument that one who incorporates his business has only himself to blame if he thereby forfeits Constitutional rights is not of Constitutional weight.

We find ourselves in a borderline Constitutional area, not well defined by the precedents. We can only estimate

how the Supreme Court of the United States would decide this case. For guidance, we look to the language of that Court in Ullmann v. United States, hereinbefore quoted. We think that to deny this Constitutional privilege to Wild, in whose circumstances the reasons for denying it, which were present in other cases relied on by the Government are absent, would violate the Supreme Court's admonition that "This Constitutional protection must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spirit."

The order appealed from is set aside and the proceeding is remanded to the District Court with a direction to dismiss the application of Bennett Y. Brewer.

KOELSCH, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

Not less venerative of the guarantee of the Fifth Amendment than my colleagues, I nonetheless believe this is not a proper case for its application. No case, to my knowledge, takes the position as does the court in this decision that the privilege declared in the Fifth Amendment extend to one other than the holder. Here the papers sought are the property of the corporation; not its shareholder, sole shareholder though he may be. Neither can it be fairly said that they are "in his possession in a purely personal capacity." Reliance on the general observation that the Fifth Amendment is ". . . not to be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spirit" seems to me to miss the mark; our inquiry must be directed to whether that Amendment is available to the appellant in these circumstances. More persuasive is *United States* v. *Guterma*, 272 F. 2d 344 (1959), identical to the instant case on its facts, which carefully accorded Fifth Amendment protection to the personal papers of the sole shareholder but denied the applicability of the privilege to records of the

corporation held by the shareholder. Quickly coming to mind is the difficulty posed for trial courts in drawing the line between corporations with but one shareholder and a closed corporation of two or more shareholders, but with one dominant shareholder; and myriad other possibilities are suggested under the rationale of the majority. The line drawn between the government's rights under a subpoena to secure corporate papers and the constitutional privileges of individuals, heretofore clear, is now obscured. I dissent.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALBERT J. WILD,
Appellant,

vs.

BENNETT Y. BREWER, Revenue Agent of the Internal Revenue Service,
Appellee.

No. 18,860

[June 2, 1964]

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona

On Rehearing

MERRILL and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges:

Judgment affirmed on the authority of *Grant v. U. S.* (1912) 227 U. S. 74, and *Wilson* v. *U. S.* (1911) 221 U. S. 361.

MADDEN, Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the decision of the court. In order to explain the reasons for my dissent, I state the facts of the case.

Brewer, an agent of the Secretary of the Treasury, served upon Wild a summons addressed to

Albert J. Wild, President
Air Conditioning Supply Company

requiring Wild to appear before Brewer to give testimony relating to the tax liability and/or the collection of the tax liability of "the above named person" and to bring with him and produce for examination certain books and records specified in the summons. All of the books and records specified were books and records of Air Conditioning Supply Company.

Wild appeared, pursuant to the summons, but refused to produce the books and records called for in the summons. He gave as the reason for his refusal the fact that the production of the books and records might tend to incriminate him and thus compel him, in a criminal case, to be a witness against himself in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that to compel him to produce the books and records would amount to an unreasonable search and seizure, in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. He stated that Air Conditioning Supply Company though it was a corporation, was owned 100 per cent by himself, and was completely controlled and directed by him.

Brewer's summons to Wild was, as it showed on its face, issued pursuant to Section 7602, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C., 1958 ed., § 7602. Section 7604 gives to the appropriate United States District Court the power, upon application by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, to issue an attachment against a person neglecting or refusing to obey a summons issued under § 7602, as for contempt. Brewer made an application to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. That court issued the attachment, held a hearing at which evidence was taken and arguments were heard, and thereafter made findings of fact and stated conclusions of

law to the effect that the privilege against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure cannot be claimed by a corporation; that the records requested were the property of Air Conditioning Company, Inc.; and that Brewer was entitled to get the records. The court ordered Wild to appear before the court at a specified time and produce the records.

Wild brought the instant appeal from that order of the District Court. The records were placed in escrow in a bank, and a stay was granted pending this appeal. The issue, then, in the appeal is whether Wild, who might be incriminated by what was written in the documents which were called for in the summons, could, in the circumstances, refuse to turn the documents over to the Government.

The privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, against the Government of the United States, "in any criminal case" not to be compelled to be a witness against one's self, is available not only to defendants in criminal trials but to witnesses in any kind of official proceeding under the auspices of the United States. It applies not only to the giving of oral testimony, but to the production from one's possession of incriminating documents or objects, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, at least if the possession is coupled with a certain minimum of right. See United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 699.

Whether the Constitutional Fathers were wise or not in inserting this guaranty in the Constitution might now, 172 years after its insertion, be regarded as irrelevant, except that when, in a case such as the instant one, special circumstances exist, it may be permissible to weigh the arguments which, in this country and in England, have been advanced for and against the privilege.

Appendix B

In the 1911 case of Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, Mr. Justice McKenna, at page 392, in a dissenting opinion strongly urging a generous interpretation of the privilege, referred to certain critical discussions of the privilege in legal literature. He said:

> Indeed, eminent legal names may be cited in criticism, if not ridicule, of the policy expressed by the Fifth Amendment, that is, the policy of protection against self-incrimination. It is declared to have no logical relation to the abuses that are said to sustain it, and that the pretense for it, so far as based on hardship, is called an "old woman's reason," (also a "lawyer's reason"), and a "double distilled and treble refined sentimentality." So far as based on unfairness it is called "the fox hunter's reason," its basis being that a criminal and a fox must have a chance to escape, the subsequent pursuit being made thereby more interesting.

Justice McKenna cited Bentham on Judicial Evidence, 1827, vol. 5, page 229 et seq., for the foregoing. His own brief response is, "A reply would be difficult if government had no other concern than the punishment of crime."

In the 1937 case of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking *obiter*, for all but one of the Justices, said:

> What is true of jury trials and indictments is true also, as the cases show, of the immunity from compulsory self-incrimination. Twining v. New Jersey, 221 U. S. 78. This too might be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as in the past there are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity as a mischief rather than a benefit, and would limit its scope or destroy it altogether. No doubt there would remain the need to give protection

against torture, physical or mental. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278. Justice, however, would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry.

In Ullman v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 426, 427, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, for the Court:

> It is relevant to define explicitly the spirit in which the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination should be approached. This command of the Fifth Amendment ("nor shall any person * * * be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself * * *") registers an important advance in the development of our liberty—"one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized." Time has not shown that protection from the evils against which this safeguard was directed is needless or unwarranted. This constitutional protection must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spirit. Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege. Such a view does scant honor to patriots who sponsored the Bill of Rights as a condition to acceptance of the Constitution by the ratifying states . . .

There is without question a general doctrine that an officer of a corporation who, as such officer, has custody of its records may not successfully refuse to produce those records in response to a subpoena issued to the corporation and served upon him as custodian, on the ground that the records contain material which would incriminate him. Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361. In that case Mr. Justice Hughes, during his earlier period of service on the

Court, wrote the opinion which directly so held. The result of the decision was that Wilson the president of the corporation, being already under indictment by the same grand jury which subpoenaed the corporation's records, was held to have been validly sentenced for contempt for refusal to supply to the grand jury documents which would be used to convict him of the crimes which the grand jury was investigating. His sentence for contempt was that he be committed "until he delivers to the United Wireless Telegraph Company the said books called for by said subpoena, and ceases to obstruct and impede the process of this Court, or otherwise purges himself of this contempt." The other directors of United Wireless were willing to produce the records if they could get them from Wilson. Wilson's plight was an unhappy one. Was it because he did not *own* the books which he was refusing to produce? Appellant Wild in our case quotes from United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 699, the statement:

> * * * the papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege, *or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity*. (Italics added.)

Wilson, of course, did not own the books nor did he have custody of them in a purely personal capacity.

A corporation does not have the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. It therefore cannot, if its records are subpoenaed, assert the Fifth Amendment privilege. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 382. It may, however, complain that a search is unreasonable if the demand for production is so broad as to be unjustifiably burdensome. Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151, 156-158. But if a cor-

poration, though under a duty to produce its records pursuant to a subpoena, is unable to do so because, as in *Wilson* v. *United States*, supra, the corporate officer who has custody records will not surrender them for production, one practical way to obtain them is by pressure on the officer. That was done in *Wilson* by his imprisonment for contempt.

With some background in the applicable doctrine, we return to the situation of the appellant Wild and his circumstantial relation to the Constitutional privilege. His corporation as such was not, as we have seen, entitled to the privilege. He did not claim the privilege for the corporation, and could not have done so. He claims it for himself, and says that he, and not any artificial legal entity, will be the one to suffer the punishment if he is obliged to furnish to the Government the evidence which will bring about his conviction. Wilson made the same contention, but his contention was rejected.

Wild quotes from United States v. White, *supra*, 322 U. S. 694, 701:

> The test, rather, is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents but rather to embody their common or group interests only.

Wild says that since he is the sole owner of his corporation, the corporation does embody the "purely private or personal interests of its [only] constituent(s)," who is Wild himself.

If there are several or many or perhaps even two stockholders in a corporation, it may well be urged by

those who had no part in any wrongdoing by the corporation or by its president or secretary who had custody of the books that their corporation and they have a right not to be embarrassed or damaged by their officer's suppressing the records which belong to them, and which he holds only as custodian for them. That was the situation in Wilson, *supra*. That reason has no application whatever to Wild's situation. He being the sole owner of the corporation, no one but himself can be affected by what he does with it or to it. Before the summons was served, he could have destroyed the records, or, indeed, everything that the corporation owned, without accountability to anyone.

What I have just said seems to leave the Government with no reason for denying the Fifth Amendment privilege to Wild, except the reason that the records which he suppressed belonged to a corporation and that, therefore, *Wilson* and other precedents deny him the Constitutional privilege. But his case differs from Wilson's in a respect which the Supreme Court thought, in *United States* v. *White*, supra, deserved the careful, though *obiter*, expression hereinabove quoted.

With regard to any importance which may attach to the fact that the records belonged to a corporation and were, merely for that reason, particularly subject to be made available to the United States, I confess, with deference, that the reason given in Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 382, viz. the impliedly reserved visitatorial power of the state which created the artificial legal entity, which power somehow is transferred to the Federal Government, seems to me to be something of a make-weight in the cases in which it has been expressed. And I think that the argument that one who incorporates his business has

only himself to blame if he thereby forfeits Constitutional rights is not of Constitutional weight.

I think that to deny this Constitutional privilege to Wild would violate the Supreme Court's admonition in *Ullman* that "This constitutional protection must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spirit."

The court rejects Wild's claim of the privilege against self-incrimination because, in the 1913 case of Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74, the owner of a one-owner corporation was not permitted to assert the privilege with regard to the corporation's papers. The Supreme Court in Grant disposed of the claim of privilege in the following language:

> Although the merits of the constitutional question are thus before us, it does not require extended discussion in view of the recent decisions of this court. The books and papers called for by the subpoena were corporate records and documents. * * * They remained subject to inspection and examination when required by competent authority * * *.

It is apparent that the Court in the Grant case did not regard it as worthy of discussion that it was, in fact, compelling an individual who was the sole owner and possessor of incriminating papers, albeit his ownership of the papers rested on his ownership of the corporation which owned them. The Court's decision was syllogistic. It stated that it had recently decided, in Wilson v. United States, *supra*, that an officer of a corporation could not successfully claim the privilege for papers belonging to the corporation but which would incriminate the officer; the papers in *Grant* were corporation papers; therefore *Grant* was ruled by *Wilson*.

Appendix B

As recently as 1937, Justice Cardozo for the Supreme Court in Palko v. Connecticut, *supra*, speaking for the Court, referred sympathetically to the views of those observers who thought the privilege itself was a mischief rather than a benefit.

I suggest that nothing which the Supreme Court has decided or said in the last two decades can be reconciled with the view that a dry syllogistic approach could compel an individual to produce his own papers from his own possession to assist his government to convict him of crime. The language of the Court in *Ullman*, *supra*, in 1950; that of the Court in *White*, *supra*, in 1944, seems to me to say that the Court will not decide a question of the constitutional right of an individual on the basis of a dry syllogism such as that General Motors is a corporation and its president could not refuse to produce its records on the ground that they might incriminate him; Air Conditioning Supply Company is a corporation, therefore its president, though he is the sole owner of the corporation and its records, cannot refuse to produce its records.

The recent decisions of the Supreme Court, a few of which are Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963), Massiah v. United States, ... U. S. ....., 84 S. Ct. R. 1199 (1964), seem to me to make this court's decision in the instant case anachronistic.

APPENDIX C

Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Constitution of the United States, Fourth Amendment:

The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code:

SEC. 7602. EXAMINATION OF BOOKS AND WITNESSES.

For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized—

(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;

(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and

(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

No. 444

ALBERT J. WILD, PETITIONER

v.

BENNETT Y. BREWER, REVENUE AGENT OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The original majority and dissenting opinions (Pet. 1a–10a) of the court of appeals are reported at 329 F. 2d 924. The majority and dissenting opinions on rehearing (Pet. 11a–20a) have not yet been reported.

JURISDICTION

The original order of the court of appeals (R. 68)[1] was entered on March 19, 1964. A petition for rehearing was granted on June 2, 1964 (R. 77–78), and

[1] "R." references are to the certified transcript of record filed in this Court.

the final judgment of the court of appeals (R. 88) was entered on that date. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on August 31, 1964. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the sole shareholder of a corporation may refuse to comply with a statutory summons for production of the corporation's books and records on the ground that he might incriminate himself.

STATUTES INVOLVED

Internal Revenue Code of 1954:

> SEC. 7602. EXAMINATION OF BOOKS AND WITNESSES.
>
> For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized--
>
> (1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
>
> (2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person

the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate, at a time and place named in the summons, and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and

(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.

* * * * *

(26 U.S.C., 1958 ed., Sec. 7602.)

SEC. 7604. ENFORCEMENT OF SUMMONS.

(a) Jurisdiction of district court.

If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data.

(b) Enforcement.

Whenever any person summoned under sections 6420(e)(2), 6421(f)(2), or 7602 neglects or refuses to obey such summons, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, or to give testimony, as required, the Secretary or his delegate may apply to the judge of the district court or to a United States commissioner for the district within which the person so summoned resides or is found for an attachment against him as for a contempt. It shall be the duty of the judge or commissioner to hear the application, and, if satisfactory proof is

> made, to issue an attachment, directed to some proper officer, for the arrest of such person, and upon his being brought before him to proceed to a hearing of the case; and upon such hearing the judge or the United States commissioner shall have power to make such order as he shall deem proper, not inconsistent with the law for the punishment of contempts, to enforce obedience to the requirements of the summons and to punish such person for his default or disobedience.

(26 U.S.C., 1958 ed., Sec. 7604.)

STATEMENT

Petitioner Wild is the president and sole stockholder of a corporation, Air Conditioning Supply Company. (R. 53–54.) Respondent Brewer, a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service, is investigating the income tax liabilities of the corporation for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1960, 1961, and 1962. (R. 4, 47–49.) In the course of his investigation the special agent issued a summons to Wild, under Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, directing him to produce certain books and records of the corporation. (R. 7–9.) Wild appeared but refused to produce on the ground that, since he owned all the stock, the corporate records were his personal property and their production might tend to incriminate him. (R. 36–37.)

The special agent then instituted the present action by filing an application for a body attachment against Wild, under Section 7604 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, asking that Wild be brought before the district court to answer for his failure to obey the

summons. (R. 3.) The application was supported by the special agent's affidavit setting forth his assignment to investigate possible income tax delinquencies of the corporation, his issuance of the summons to Wild, and Wild's refusal to comply. (R. 4–6.) Notice of the application was served on Wild. (R. 6.)

At the hearing, Wild's counsel made little objection to the issuance of the body attachment, but asked for an immediate hearing on the merits. The district court, therefore, issued the attachment and proceeded with the hearing at once. (R. 22–24.) The government took the position that the sole stockholder of a corporation, when summoned to produce corporate books, cannot claim his personal privilege against self-incrimination. (R. 25–26.) Wild's position was that, as sole stockholder, he was the owner of the corporate records, and that an order directing him to produce them, over his claim of possible self-incrimination, would violate both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. (R. 27–32.) The special agent testified to the issuance of the summons and Wild's refusal to comply (R. 32–42), and that it was necessary that he examine the corporate records in order to determine whether the corporation's income taxes had been fraudulently understated in its returns.* (R. 43–49). Wild testified that he owned all the stock of the corporation, hired and fired all its officers and employees, and had its books and records in his personal possession. (R. 54.) He admitted that the

*Apparently the special agent had some indication that certain checks had been received by the corporation but not reported in its returns. (R. 49–50.)

MICRO CARD 22.
TRADE MARK ®
MATTHEW BENDER & COMPANY
MB
CD205
59-59
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microcard

corporation filed income tax returns, owned property and paid expenses by corporate checks, and that he himself filed individual returns. (R. 55–56.)

The district court found that the special agent, pursuant to his statutory authority, had issued the summons to Wild in the latter's capacity as an officer of the corporation; and that Wild had refused to comply on the ground that production of the corporate records might incriminate him. (R. 10–12.) The court concluded that the privilege against self-incrimination was inapplicable, and that corporation's records were a proper object of the summons. Wild was ordered to produce them. (R. 12.)

The original opinion of the court of appeals (Judge Koelsch, dissenting) reversed the order of the district court on the ground that the sole stockholder of a corporation may invoke his privilege against self-incrimination when ordered to produce corporate records. (Pet. 1a–10a.) On rehearing, however, the court (Judge Madden, dissenting) affirmed the district court's order of production in reliance on *Grant* v. *United States*, 227 U.S. 74, and *Wilson* v. *United States*, 221 U.S. 361. (Pet. 11a–20a.)

ARGUMENT

1. This Court has consistently held that a stockholder, officer, or other custodian of corporate records may not interpose his personal privilege against self-incrimination when called upon to produce corporate records in his possession. *Wilson* v. *United States*, 221 U.S. 361; *Wheeler* v. *United States*, 226 U.S. 478, 490; *Grant* v. *United States*, 227 U.S. 74, 79–80; *Essgee* v. *United States*, 262 U.S. 151; *United States* v.

White, 322 U.S. 694, 700; *Nilva* v. *United States*, 352 U.S. 385, 392; *Curcio* v. *United States*, 354 U.S. 118, 122, 124–125, 128. And in *Grant*, *supra*, the Court held that the privilege was unavailable even when the custodian was, as here, the sole stockholder of the corporation.[3]

Contrary to petitioner's suggestion (Pet. 8), *United States* v. *White*, *supra*, in no way departs from this settled principle. Most of the above cases upholding the right of public authorities to compel production of corporate records were based on the rationale that a corporation is chartered by the State for the benefit of the public and holds its special privileges and franchises subject to certain duties, including the duty to submit its books for examination upon demand by the proper authorities. See, *e.g.*, *Wilson* v. *United States*, *supra*, 221 U.S. at 380–385. In *White*, the Court explicitly reaffirmed that principle as to corporate records (322 U.S. at 700) and went even further, stating that "the absence of [State incorporation] as to a particular type of organization does not lessen the public necessity for making reasonable regulations of its activities effective, nor does it confer upon such an organization the purely personal privilege against self-incrimination." It was in that context—and solely with respect to unincorporated associations such as labor unions—that the Court laid down the test referred to by petitioner (Pet. 8), *i.e.*, "whether one can

[3] Similar arguments by sole stockholders have recently been rejected in two cases in the Second Circuit. *United States* v. *Fago*, 319 F. 2d 791, 792–793, certiorari denied, 375 U.S. 906; and *United States* v. *Guterma*, 272 F. 2d 344, 346.

fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests only" (at 701).

2. In the district court petitioner's sole argument was that enforcement of the summons, over his claim of possible self-incrimination, would constitute a violation of both the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments. Petitioner now alleges (Pet. 5, 10–13) two additional violations of the unreasonable search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment: (1) that an Internal Revenue summons may not be used to develop evidence for use in a possible criminal case; and (2) that the government made no showing of necessity for examination of the corporation's books.[1] Neither of these arguments was properly preserved in the trial court. And both are without merit. As to the first, the courts of appeals have consistently held that a special agent may issue a summons in furtherance of an investigation which may possibly lead to a criminal prosecution. *Boren* v. *Tucker*, 239 F. 2d 767 (C.A. 9th); *In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc.*, 311 F. 2d 12 (C.A. 2d), certiorari denied, 373 U.S.

[1] Petitioner did not question the special agent's authority to issue the summons in the district court, and these arguments were first raised in his reply brief in the court of appeals. They are not referred to in any of the opinions in that court.

902; *Siegel* v. *Tyson*, 331 F. 2d 604 (C.A. 5th); *Tillotson* v. *Boughner*, 333 F. 2d 515 (C.A. 7th), petition for certiorari pending, No. 434, this Term. The two cases upon which petitioner relies[5] both involved the use of a summons after an indictment had actually been returned. As to the second argument, there are no cases suggesting that the government must offer evidence to support a summons concerning a taxpayer's liability during the three-year period before the statute of limitations has run. The cases upon which petitioner relies (Pet. 12) all involved investigations into tax years as to which the statute of limitations on assessment (26 U.S.C. 6501) had run in the absence of fraud, whereas the period of limitation was still open at the time the summons was issued in this case.[6] Furthermore, the necessity for the issuance of the summons is clear from the record. So far as appears, the special agent and a revenue agent (R. 49) were engaged in a first audit of the corporation's returns; the books and records were manifestly relevant to that investigation; and the agents had developed some evidence that certain checks payable to the corporation had not been included in its gross receipts (R. 49–50).

[5] *Application of Myers*, 202 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Pa.), and *United States* v. *O'Connor*, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass.).

[6] Similarly, *Ryan* v. *United States*, No. 12, this Term, and *United States* v. *Powell*, No. 54, this Term, involve the different issue whether the government must offer evidence to support a subpoena issued after the statute of limitations has run.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

ARCHIBALD COX,
Solicitor General.
JOHN B. JONES, JR.,
Acting Assistant Attorney General.
JOSEPH M. HOWARD,
BURTON BERKLEY,
Attorneys.

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

No. 444

ALBERT J. WILD, *Petitioner*,

v.

BENNETT Y. BREWER, Revenue Agent of the Internal Revenue Service, *Respondent*.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

W. LEE MCLANE
2101 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C.
Counsel for Petitioner

JACK E. BROWN
THADDEUS ROJEK
ARTHUR P. ALLSWORTH
Of Counsel

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

Respondent's opposition to the petition herein is subject to serious infirmities. And because the Petitioner is currently under criminal income tax investigation by the Respondent, who seeks the disputed books and records solely for purposes of that criminal investigation,[1] and who may be convicted of a felony

[1] See the fourth point, *infra*, pp. 5-8, and R. 43-52.

and deprived of his freedom if Respondent obtains access to those records, the Court is asked to consider with special care the following reasons why Respondent's brief should not be given material weight.

1. First, an unnatural silence by Respondent has been the latter's response to Petitioner's contention that the issues herein raise important Fifth Amendment questions which have recurring effects on the administration of Internal Revenue Code criminal investigations by Special Intelligence Agents. Yet Respondent's counsel has already recognized the growing importance of the increasing litigation on such issues in the Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1963, at page 331, wherein he reported to the Congress that:

> "The Tax Division has taken *additional* steps during the fiscal year to centralize the litigation involving the issuance of summonses by *special agents of the Intelligence Division* in order to insure that the litigation in this area does not delay the investigations by the Internal Revenue Service and to insure a consistent approach[2] to the *growing legal issues* raised in this field." (Italics supplied)

Therefore, since the Government has conceded the recurring nature of the issues and has created a particular section or group to cope with such cases, it would appear to be in its interests as well as the Petitioner's

[2] Probably this explains why the individual legal counsel for Respondent herein also appear for another Special Intelligence Agent in *Boughner* v. *Tillotson*, petition for certiorari pending, No. 434, this Term, in which the narrower issue of whether a Special Agent may issue a summons under Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 7602, is presented as the primary question.

for the Court to review one of the most important of those issues: Whether the sole stockholder of a corporation, currently under criminal income tax investigation, can be compelled by the Special Intelligence Agent investigating him, to produce the books and records of his corporation so that those records may be used against him, or whether the Fifth Amendment denies the Government such an inquisitorial sledge hammer.

2. Next, the Respondent's statement that *Grant* v. *United States*, 227 U.S. 74 (1913), "held" that the privilege was "unavailable even when the custodian was, as here, the sole stockholder of the corporation," is not dispositive, even if it were correct.[3] It is not dispositive in determining whether a writ should issue because this Court does not hesitate to re-examine its earlier decisions where important constitutional rights are involved. Among many such instances, the Court recently re-examined and rejected its earlier decisions respecting the application of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment. *Malloy* v. *Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); *Murphy* v. *Waterfront Commission*, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).

Here such re-examination is all the more desirable because, as was stated by Judge Madden herein, "The Court's decision [in *Grant*, *supra*,] was syllogistic." And, as further stated by Judge Madden:

> "I suggest that nothing which the Supreme Court has decided or said in the last two decades

[3] Not only did Respondent not even cite *Grant*, *supra*, to the court of appeals until after it had ruled against him, but a close reading of the opinion and briefs in *Grant*, *supra*, leaves a serious question of whether the issue herein was fully briefed and considered by the Court as the central issue therein.

can be reconciled with the view that a dry syllogistic approach could compel an individual to produce his own papers from his own possession to assist his government to convict him of crime. The language of the Court in *Ullman, supra,* in 1956; that of the Court in *White, supra,* in 1944, seems to me to say that the Court will not decide a question of the constitutional right of an individual on the basis of a dry syllogism such as that General Motors is a corporation and its president could not refuse to produce its records on the ground that they might incriminate him; Air Conditioning Supply Company is a corporation, therefore its president, though he is the sole owner of the corporation and its records, cannot refuse to produce its records.

The recent decisions of the Supreme Court, a few of which are Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Massiah v. United States, ... U.S. ....., 84 S. Ct. R. 1199 (1964), seems to me to make this court's decision in the instant case anachronistic."

Therefore, if *Grant, supra,* has any remaining validity in view of the policies and purposes of the Fifth Amendment as most recently expressed by this Court in *Murphy, supra* (378 U.S. 55), the Government will have an opportunity to state what it is upon review. To date it has not done so, but has merely cited *Grant, supra,* which, when applied to the facts of this case, means that a citizen who does business in the corporate form is deprived of one of his basic liberties as set forth in the Fifth Amendment.

3. Third, the Government has consistently, in recent years, urged the Court to review decisions involving the possible abridgement of constitutional rights by the States (e.g. re-apportionment and civil rights). Yet,

here, where the federal government itself is the aggressor in such a possible abridgement of a constitutional right, it opposes a review. But since the constitutional rights of a citizen against the federal government are certainly as important as those protecting him from the States, and it matters very little to a citizen whether he is locked up in a federal or a state prison, the Government's opposition to review is entitled to no more weight than the prior opposition of the States. The vested interest of the Government here (a free hand to convict a citizen with his own books and records) is no stronger than the prior vested interests of the States who similarly resisted a re-examination of earler decisions which gave them a free and heavy hand.

4. Fourth, although the Respondent has ostensibly not replied herein to Petitioner's statement, supported by the record herein, that he, as a Special Intelligence Agent, is seeking only to convict Petitioner of a crime and not to ascertain the latter's correct tax liability, the Government's statements in its opposition to the petition in *Boughner* v. *Tillotson*, No. 434, this Term, filed by the same counsel appearing herein, leave the very erroneous general inference that a Special Intelligence Agent also determines civil tax liability. That such is wholly incorrect is amply shown by Burns, *Searches and Seizures: The Suppression of Evidence*, N.Y.U. 20th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1081, 1087 (1962): *United States* v. *Lipshitz*, 132 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. N.Y.). These authorities, both of which were cited in the petition herein, were not responded to by the Government although Burns, a former Special Assistant to the Attorney General, categorically states:

> "Some courts have failed to realize the great distinction between the function of an Internal

Revenue Agent and a Special Agent. The Constitution gives the Government the right to collect taxes and Congress has enacted statutes containing various provisions to enable the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to investigate both civil tax liability and criminal offenses against the revenue. These are two separate and distinct functions, and he has set up separate and distinct divisions to carry out these functions. The function of investigating to determine civil tax liability has been assigned by the Commissioner to Internal Revenue Agents, who are in the Audit Division.

> The *sole* function of a Special Agent in the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service *is to seek evidence of crimes.* He has *no concern whatsoever* with the *amount* or *collection* of any additional tax, these being strictly the concern of the revenue agent. He is exactly the same as any other Treasury Agent who may seek evidence of narcotics, counterfeiting, alcohol tax, customs violations, etc. *A special agent is a criminal law enforcement* officer, *just like any other* state or municipal *detective* or *policeman.* He, like any other government agent who enforces the criminal law must obtain a valid search warrant." (Emphasis supplied.)

That is, the Special Agent is no different than an F.B.I. agent insofar as his purpose is concerned. Thus, the Court may properly ask itself whether it would review the decision below if the criminal investigation of Internal Revenue Code violations had been assigned to the F.B.I., and the Government was now contending that an F.B.I. agent was entitled to summon the sole stockholder of a corporation then under criminal investigation and require the stockholder to produce his corporation's books and records so they could be used to convict the said sole stockholder of a crime.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner submits that the time has come for the Court to entertain full argument on the question of whether the citizen accused of tax crime is not being deprived of constitutional rights which are accorded by this Court to those accused of murder, rape, treason, burglary and other felonies. Are not the rules of criminal procedure and constitutional rights which apply to other types of crimes equally applicable to those charged under the Internal Revenue Code? The Sixteenth Amendment gave the Government the right to levy and collect an income tax, but it did not also provide that the Fifth Amendment's protections were to be watered down in order to collect that tax. The needs of a revenue collection system are surely not so compelling that the spirit of the Fifth Amendment must be weakened, and a double standard created to deny those who are suspected of tax crimes the constitutional privilege against self incrimination.

For the reasons stated in the Petition, as well as herein, the issues set forth in the Petition should be reviewed and decided by this Court. The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM LEE MCLANE
2101 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C.
Counsel for Petitioner

JACK E. BROWN
THADDEUS ROJEK
ARTHUR P. ALLSWORTH
Of Counsel